Field Notes / AI Security
The Anthropic “Mythos” leak was fake. The instruction to run its code was real.
On 1 November 2026 a Hugging Face repository claiming to hold a 14-trillion-parameter Anthropic model went viral. Within two hours, volunteers proved the weights were random numbers generated from each tensor’s name. The repository also told anyone who wanted to load it to run Python files written by an anonymous account. Here is how the fake was caught, why the download was the risky part, and five rules for the models your engineers pull onto work machines.
01 What the repository claimed
n account called burner22 created the repository “numbat” on 23 October and last changed it a day later. It holds 772 weight shards, 7.72 terabytes in all. Its model card describes an unreleased Anthropic training run: about 14 trillion parameters, 1,224 experts, stopped mid-pretraining at step 1,830,000 model card .
The card has its own FAQ. To “Is this real?” it answers “Yes.” It offers no evidence beyond that. On 1 November, around 14:53 UTC, posts on X picked it up and the story spread fast CellCog .
02 How the fake was caught
Repository discussion #13, via explainx.ai
The test is simple. Take a tensor’s name, hash it with SHA-256, and use the first 8 bytes to seed NumPy’s random generator. Draw numbers in the tensor’s shape, apply a fixed scale, round to the stored format. An auditor posted at 16:29 UTC that 43 complete tensors match the file exactly explainx.ai . Another user reported matching signs across 5,503 tensors in 770 of the 772 shards. CellCog reran the check and ran a control with a different seed. The control matched nothing CellCog .
The metadata helped too. Hugging Face lists 6.8 trillion parameters against the card’s 14 trillion, because 4-bit values sit packed two to a byte. Someone built a well-made shell and filled it with noise. Anthropic had made no statement by 2 November.
03 The part that was real
The weight files are safetensors. That format stores numbers and does
not run code on load. The card’s loading instructions are another
matter. They call the model with trust_remote_code=True,
and the repository ships modeling_numbat.py and
configuration_numbat.py model card . That flag tells the
library to download those files and execute them with your
permissions.
We have not seen a published review showing the code is harmful. That is beside the point. Picture who loads a 7.72 TB model the day it goes viral: an engineer, on a GPU server or a well-specified laptop, with cloud credentials, API keys and source code within reach. Any code that runs there can read all of it. Pickle files carry the same risk: in 2024 JFrog found about 100 models on Hugging Face that ran code on the machine loading them Dark Reading .
- Never set trust_remote_code on a model from an author you have not vetted. Read the .py files first, or do not load it
- Accept safetensors only. Refuse pickle, .bin and .pt files from anyone outside a short allowlist
- Load anything new on an isolated machine with no cloud credentials, no SSH keys and no access to your code
- Mirror approved models to an internal store and point your pipelines there, not at the public hub
- Ask your engineers today who downloaded numbat, and on which machine. Then check what that machine can reach
You will see the next “leak” within months. Find out now what a single download on one engineer’s machine can reach, and close that path before someone else tests it for you. Enterprise-grade. Not enterprise-priced.
References
Sources
- Hugging Face. burner22/numbat model card and file list. Read 2 November 2026. huggingface.co
- CellCog. “The 14T Mythos Leak Is Fake: Seeded Noise, Not Weights.” 1 November 2026. cellcog.ai
- explainx.ai. “Anthropic Mythos Leak on Hugging Face: Why It Looks Fake.” November 2026. explainx.ai
- Dark Reading. “Hugging Face AI Platform Riddled With 100 Malicious Code-Execution Models.” February 2024. darkreading.com